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Introduction
Many systems transmit information to the outside world during their operation. For example, location-based services require devices such as smartphones to transmit location information to other devices or to servers in the cloud. Similarly, in defense and aerospace applications, a network of drones may need to broadcast location information to a variety of agents, including other drones, ground personnel, and remote base stations. These settings often involve nodes that are resource-constrained or connected in ad-hoc, dynamically-changing networks. Some of the transmitted information may reveal secrets about the system or its users; therefore, privacy is an important design consideration. At the same time, the agents to which this information is being sent must have enough information to provide relevant services or perform other actions. Thus, the transmission of information from the system to the outside world needs to balance the contrasting requirements of privacy and utility.
Consider the following illustrative example: Example 1. We consider a user Alice moving in a building. Information about Alice's location needs to be sent to a server and other agents in order to perform some useful actions; e.g., adjusting the heating system based on Alice's location and other occupancy levels in the building, or directing her to the closest coffee machine. Suppose also that there are some "secret" locations, and that Alice does not want others to know when or whether she visits these locations. An example could be a room containing highly sensitive data, such that the mere act of being able to visit it discloses compromising information that Alice wishes to protect (i.e., there are only a handful of people who can visit this room, and their identity is to be kept secret). However, Alice also wants the server to be able to compute some information that is useful based on her location, because otherwise Alice is always cold and uncaffeinated. Suppose that an "event generator" (e.g., on Alice's phone) generates events based on her movements, and broadcasts these events to other agents. Suppose further that the quality of the service that requires tracking Alice's reported location degrades based on the Euclidean distance from her true location. How can one generate an output event stream that does not reveal whether Alice visited a secret location while also providing sufficient accuracy for determining her location for the relevant services?
Following the terminology used in supervisory control of discrete event systems [9] , we refer to the combination of the event generator and the process it is based on (Alice, in our example) as the plant. Our goal is to introduce an element of decisionmaking into the event generator so that it can modify the events to be output before relaying them in order to meet both the privacy and utility requirements. We refer to this decision-making as an obfuscation policy.
In this paper, we present a formalization of this problem, along with an algorithm to synthesize an obfuscation policy. We are given a plant modeled as a finite automaton, with formally specified secret behaviors and a specification of utility. The plant must generate event strings that provide sufficient utility while hiding its secret behaviors from an outside observer. The privacy and utility specifications are captured as automata-theoretic requirements on the model of the plant. To enforce both specifications, we propose an obfuscation mechanism whereby the plant edits its output in a reactive manner, such that all resulting output strings provably satisfy the specifications. The presented algorithm synthesizes a correct-by-construction edit function that maps true executions of the plant to ones that achieve the privacy and utility specifications.
The paper is structured as follows. We first define the obfuscation problem in Section 2. In Section 3 we describe our algorithm for automatically editing reported values. The treatment in this section is "explicit", i.e., in terms of graph operations on discrete game structures. To address the state explosion problem, we encode the synthesis algorithm symbolically using Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [1] , as described in Section 4. We then demonstrate our approach empirically in Section 5, using EdiSyn, an open source Python toolkit we developed for this purpose. We conclude after a discussion about related work and future directions.
Preliminaries and Problem Statement 2.1 Preliminaries
A Nondeterministic Finite Automaton (NFA) is a tuple G = (Q, Σ, δ, Q 0 ) with a finite set of states Q, a finite set of events Σ, a partial state transition function δ : Q × Σ → Q , and a set of initial states Q 0 ⊆ Q. An NFA G is called a Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) when |Q 0 | = 1 and |δ(q, e)| ≤ 1 for every state q ∈ Q and event e ∈ Σ. More explicitly, for a DFA as G = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 ), the single initial state is q 0 ∈ Q and the transition function is δ : Q × Σ → Q, which deterministically defines the next state given the current state and the event.
Given an NFA transition function δ : Q × Σ → 2 Q , we extend it to δ * : Q × Σ * → 2 Q recursively as follows: δ * (q, ε) = {q}, δ * (q, e) = δ(q, e), δ * (q, e 1 e 2 · · · e n ) = ∪ q ∈δ * (q,e1) δ * (q , e 2 · · · e n ), where Σ * is the set of finite strings of events and ε denotes the empty string. The language generated by G is the set of strings defined by L(G) := {t ∈ Σ * : ∃q 0 ∈ Q 0 s.t. δ * (q 0 , t) = ∅}. A DFA transition function δ : Q × Σ → Q is extended to δ * : Q × Σ * → Q in a similar manner. Also, the language of a DFA is defined similarly. Given string t, we use t t to denote that string t is a prefix of t, and use t 1:k to denote the length-k prefix of t. Finally, |t| denotes the length of t. In this paper, the system of interest, called the plant, is modeled as a DFA G = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 ). In our model, the state of the plant cannot be observed directly. However, upon each transition, an event is emitted and can be observed by an outside observer. Hence, an outside observer can infer the state of the plant based on the observation of the string of events emitted upon transitions.
Threat Model
We consider a scenario where the plant G has a set of secret states Q S ⊂ Q that need to be kept hidden from the outside observer. The observer of the plant's output strings is a passive-but-curious adversary that has a copy of G, and can see all strings output by the plant; the observer can mimic transitions in its copy of G based on the output strings. We assume that the observer is also a legitimate recipient in the sense that the plant emits strings in order to deliver some information to the observer. However, the plant also wants to hide from the observer whether it is ever in a secret state.
In the following, we will call a string t ∈ L(G) a secret string if δ * (q 0 , t) ∈ Q S and a public string otherwise.
Example 2. Alice and Bob are trying to arrange a secret meeting to exchange a top secret package in a m × n grid world. We model the generator of Alice and Bob's movements as a plant G = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 ) with secret states Q S , where -The set of states is Q = Loc 2 ∪ {init} where Loc = {1, · · · , m × n} contains the set of all locations on the grid word.
-The set of events is Σ = {a ij b kl : i, j, k, l ∈ Loc}, where a ij b kl specifies Alice's movement from i to j and Bob's movement from k to l. -The transition function δ is defined such that, for both Alice and Bob, only moving to neighboring locations or staying at the current location is allowed. -The set of secret states is Q S = {(i, k) ∈ Loc : i = k}, where Alice and Bob are in the same location.
We show in Figure 1 , j) , there is a transition from (i, j) to (k, l) with event label a ik b jl as long as k is a neighboring location of i and l is a neighboring location of j. The red states in G are secret where Alice and Bob meet in the same location.
Let the quality of the service degrade with the L 1 distance from Alice's and Bob's true locations. That is, the quality loss from state
where i x and i y are the x-coordinate and y-coordinate of location i, and similarly for locations j, k, l. Hence, in reporting the locations of Alice and Bob, we would like to maintain the L 1 -distance between the real and the reported locations within some allowable range. This could be because we want an external observer to be able to track the progress of Alice and Bob towards their goal of meeting, while not knowing exactly when or where they meet. 
Edit Functions
To defend against attacks as described in the previous section, we propose to add an interface at the output of the plant that hides secret strings while preserving the utility of the original string. The interface edits the plant's original string t as it is produced ("online"), such that the resulting stringt after editing never reveals the secret, and yet preserves the utility of t within an allowable range. As this interface is a function that maps each plant output event to another event or string, we refer to it as an edit function. We permit edit functions f e : Σ * × Σ → Σ * that map an output event to another event or string with one replacement, deletion, or insertion operation. Given past output string t, f e (t, e) = o means that the plant's output event e is edited to o. Note that o ∈ Σ * in general because we allow event insertion as well as deletion. If event e is deleted, then the output is o = ; on the other hand, if a string t I is inserted before e, then the output is o = t I e. Every edit function is causal: it can only edit the current output event e and not any previous output. For convenience of notation, we also define a string-based edit functionf e : Σ * → Σ * recursively from f e such thatf e (ε) = ε and f e (te) =f e (t)f e (t, e). Note that, in general,f e is a partial function, andf e (t) may only be defined for selected t ∈ Σ * . Also, since an edit function is causal, its string-based version is prefix-preserving:
). An edit function of the above form can be implemented by a deterministic, potentially infinite-state automaton, which we call the edit automaton, and denote by EA = (S, Σ, T rans, s 0 ). The elements of the EA tuple are the set of states S, the set of events Σ, the transition relation T rans ⊆ S × Σ × Σ * × S, and the initial state s 0 . Each transition in T rans is a tuple (s, e, o, s ) of the starting state s, the input event e, the output string o, and the target state s . Given an edit function f e , there is a corresponding transition relation T rans with (s, e, o, s ) ∈ T rans iff f e (t, e) = o and s is the state reached on input string t. The transition relation for f e is deterministic: ∀s ∈ S, ∀e ∈ Σ, |{s : (s, e, o, s ) ∈ T rans, o ∈ Σ * }| = 1. Throughout the paper, we use "edit" to collectively refer to any replacement, deletion, and insertion operation. We will call the output string from the plant as the original string t, and call the string after editing as the obfuscated stringt.
Problem Formulation
Our goal is to synthesize an edit function f e that hides the plant's secret strings while preserving the utility of the original strings within some allowable range. We capture the utility of each original string t by the final state that is reached by t in the plant DFA, and define the utility loss in mapping t tot by the utility difference between the states reached by t andt. Without loss of generality, we model the utility loss by an integer-valued distance metric D : Q × Q → N. The formal statement of the synthesis problem is as follows:
Problem 1 (Edit Synthesis) Given a plant modeled as DFA G = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 ) with a set of secret states Q S ⊂ Q, utility distance D : Q × Q → N, and accuracy budget W ∈ N, construct an edit automaton EA = (S, Σ, T rans, s 0 ) implementing an edit function f e such that:
Remark 1. Note that the privacy specification is a safety property on the output of the edit function.
Edit Synthesis Algorithm
We solve Problem 1 by formulating it as a safety game between the edit function and the plant. Such game formulations are common for program synthesis, where the program is modeled as a protagonist playing against the adversarial environment, with the goal of satisfying a given specification. For the edit synthesis problem, the edit function is the "program" to be synthesized, and the plant is the environment that provides inputs to the edit function: adversarialism here means that the plant can evolve arbitrarily, and the edit function must satisfy the specification under all possible evolutions.
Edit Patterns Satisfying the Specifications
To construct the game, we first want to easily determine whether an edit pattern satisfies the privacy and utility specifications. One challenge is that determining whether an edit pattern satisfies the privacy and utility specifications requires examining not only the obfuscated string, but also its distance from the original string. Fortunately, we can construct an NFA that recognizes all valid edit patterns.
Lemma 1 There exists an NFA PA, with state space O(|Q| 2 ) , that recognizes all edit patterns satisfying the privacy specification in Problem 1.
Proof Sketch. Given G, we first build the "edit-pattern" NFA G e = (Q, Σ ∪{ε}, δ e , q 0 ) that recognizes all edit patterns, by adding transitions to G. Transition function δ e is defined with respect to decomposition δ e := δ ∪ δ r ∪ δ i . More concretely, consider the plant G in Figure 1(b) . The corresponding G e is built as shown in Figure 2 (a), such that (i) all original transitions exist, as depicted by the (black) solid arrows; (ii) the replacement transitions δ r are defined by adding a replacement transition for every event in parallel with the original transition, as depicted by the (red) dashed arrows; and (ii) the insertion transitions δ i are defined by adding a self loop for every event at every state, as depicted by the (blue) dotted arrows. No replacement or insertion transition is added if an original transition for the given event already exists. Deletion is subsumed by replacement, as deleting an event is the same as replacing the event by the empty string ε. We then construct in Figure 2 (b) the "public-behavior" DFA G p = (Q, Σ, δ p , q 0 ) from G, by pruning away all secret states. Finally, to find all edit patterns satisfying the privacy specification, we compose G e and G p and build the product automaton PA. Specifically, the composition synchronizes δ and δ p (the original transitions), δ r and δ p (the replacement transitions), and δ i and δ p (the insertion transitions), thereby preserving the edit choices. In sum, since G e recognizes all edit patterns and G p recognizes all public behaviors, PA recognizes each edit pattern for which no obfuscated string ever visits secret states.
Note that, as an interface at the output of the plant, the edit function does not change the plant's original dynamics. This feature is captured in our construction of G e : neither insertion nor replacement transition changes the real plant state in G e . Consider an edit pattern with t,t, and edit operations. We can uniquely determine a path because each edit transition function is deterministic. Given an edit pattern from t tot, by the construction of PA, the ending state of the trace of this edit pattern in PA is a state pair (q e , q p ) where q e = δ * (q 0 , t) is the plant's real state and q p = δ * (q 0 ,t) is the state perceived by the outside observer based ont. Hence, with PA capturing the pair (q e , q p ) = (δ * (q 0 , t), δ * (q 0 ,t)) for every t, we can now build from PA an NFA that recognizes all edit patterns satisfying both the privacy and the utility specifications.
Lemma 2 There exists an NFA A, with state space O(|Q| 2 ), that recognizes all edit patterns satisfying the privacy and the utility specifications in Problem 1. Figure 1(b) . In Ge, the solid black arrows depict the original transitions, the dotted blue arrows depict the insertion transitions, and the dashed red arrows depict the replacement transitions.
Proof. Consider PA from Lemma 1 that recognizes all editing patterns satisfying the privacy specification. Because the distance function D is defined with respect to state pairs, we can determine if the given editing pattern violates the utility specification based on the reached state pair in PA. That is, we can build A from PA by pruning all (q e , q p ) where D(q e , q p ) > W .
Safety Game Formulation
The edit synthesis problem is formulated as a safety game between the edit function and the plant. In the safety game, the outputs of the plant are the inputs to the edit function, and the edit function must react to its inputs (i.e., the plant's outputs) and satisfy both the privacy and the utility specifications. If the edit function can reactively satisfy the specifications regardless of what the plant does, then its reactions form a winning strategy in the formulated safety game. Conversely, a winning strategy in the safety game can be converted into an edit function that solves the edit synthesis problem.
Formally, a two-player safety game structure is GS = (V 1 , V 2 , Σ, ρ 1 , ρ 2 , v 0 ) where V 1 and V 2 are sets of game positions, Σ is the action set, ρ 1 :
are the transition functions, and v 0 ∈ V 1 is the initial position. We note that, actions of the edit function are strings in Σ * and ρ 2 has a domain of V 2 × Σ * because the edit function can react by inserting a string. The game starts with player 1, and subsequent plays alternate between players 1 and 2. Position ⊥ is a special position where player 2 loses and player 1 wins.
In the game corresponding to the edit synthesis problem, player 1 is the plant, who moves on positions in V 1 according to transition function ρ 1 , and player 2 is the edit function, who moves on positions in V 2 according to ρ 2 . A play of GS is a sequence of positions
* that starts from the initial position. Given a play, the edit function wins if ⊥ is never visited, and the plant wins otherwise.
Consider the automaton A = (Q 2 , Σ ∪ {ε}, δ A , q A,0 ) in Lemma 2. Recall from Lemma 1 that the transition function of G e is decomposed, and the synchronous composition used to obtain PA distinguishes edit choices. Hence, δ A can also be decomposed into the original transition function δ A,o , the replacement transition function δ A,r , and the insertion transition function δ A,i . We build the safety game structure GS = (V 1 , V 2 , Σ, ρ 1 , ρ 2 , v 0 ) between the edit function and the plant from A as follows.
is defined, and q e = δ(q e , e) (iii) ρ 2 ((q e , q p ), e), o = δ A,o δ * A,i ((q e , q p ), t I ), e if o = t I e, t I ∈ Σ * , and
Transition functions ρ 1 and ρ 2 define all possible actions of the plant and the edit function, respectively. Specifically, ρ 1 captures the plant dynamics and is determined by the plant's transition function δ. On the other hand, ρ 2 defines all edit actions. Cases (i)-(iii) are edit actions defined in A, which by Lemma 2 satisfy both the private and the utility specifications. In particular, the edit function outputs the original event from the plant in case (i), replace or delete the plant's original output event in case (ii), insert events before the plant's original output event in case (iii). In case (iv), the edit action cannot satisfy the specifications and leads to the losing position ⊥. For every plant's output event, the edit function reacts with one edit operation.
Symbolic Encoding of Edit Synthesis
So far we have assumed that the plant automaton model in the edit synthesis problem is given explicitly, i.e., as an explicit list of states and transitions. However, in practice, such explicit representations lead to what is known as the state explosion problem: a system with n variables that take k possible values requires at least k n states to model, and thus these models quickly become impractical. In order to mitigate the state explosion problem, we represent the plant model symbolically using sets of states and sets of transitions, both represented compactly as implicit solutions to logical equations. We can then analyze the state space symbolically using Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [1] . By using BDDs to reason about propositional formulas representing the state space, we avoid building the state graph explicitly.
In this section, we present our encoding of the given plant automaton symbolically using propositional formulae. We will explain how the safety game can be constructed symbolically, as well as how to extract a winning edit strategy from the symbolic encoding of the safety game.
Symbolic Automata
Given an explicit DFA G = (Q, Σ, δ, Q 0 ), we encode G symbolically as (B Q , B Σ , ∆ δ , b q0 ), where B Q = {y With a slight abuse of notation, we write b q ∈ Q if b q is the Boolean encoding of a state in Q and use b q directly to refer to the given state; similar notation applies for events and primed states. We use ∆ to denote the propositional formulae for transition functions. Propositional formula ∆ δ is defined such that
To symbolically solve the edit synthesis problem, it remains for us to encode the privacy and utility specifications. We encode the secret state set Q S as a Boolean function χ Q S : B Q → {0, 1} such that χ Qs (b q ) = 1 iff state b q ∈ Q S . Given the utility distance function D and the accuracy budget W , we construct a propositional function
e., the accuracy loss in obfuscating state b q to state b q is bounded by the given budget.
Symbolic Game Structure
We are now ready to solve the edit synthesis problem symbolically. Consider the plant modeled as a symbolic automaton G = (B Q , B Σ , ∆ δ , b q0 ), the symbolic encoding of secret states χ Q S , and the propositional formula for the utility specification ∆ D W . We follow the procedures in Section 3, first building symbolic intermediate automata G e , G p , PA, and A and then build the symbolic game structure.
First, we construct the symbolic edit-pattern NFA G e = (B e , B Σ , ∆ δe , b e0 ) where:
-B e = {y q 1 , · · · , y q n } are the Boolean variables for the original plant states.
• ∆ δ defines the original transitions.
• ∆ δr = (∃y Σ .∆ δ ) ∧ ¬∆ δ defines the replacement transitions.
• ∆ δi = (y q ⇔ y q ) ∧ ¬∆ δ defines the insertion transitions.
We can similarly build the symbolic public-behavior DFA G p = (B p , B Σ , ∆ δp , b p0 ), where B p are the Boolean variables for the fake states and ∆ δp prunes all secret states. Next, we build the product automaton PA from G e and G p , and then prune the state pairs that violate the utility specification to obtain A = ( 
Observe that ∆ ρ2 is decomposed into two parts, one containing the original and the replacement actions ∆ ρ2,or , and another containing only the insertion actions ∆ ρ2,i . We make this partition because the outputs for insertion actions are in general strings whose lengths are not known in advance. To symbolically encode all such output strings, we would need to introduce a potentially unbounded number of Boolean variables corresponding to all possible events and intermediate states on allowed output strings. To avoid this, we only encode in the game construction whether it is possible for the edit function to react with an insertion action. That is, a transition
if it is possible to move from position b V to position b V with insertion. Here, the output b O is unconstrained as it is not used: the actual insertion string will be computed explicitly in the synthesis algorithm in Section 4.3. We use µ-calculus [6, 3] to formulate the problem of determining whether it is possible to apply insertion actions. The µ-calculus formula µZ.P ost i (y A ) ∨ P ost i (Z) is the least fixed point that computes all positions that are reachable from y A via a non-zero length insertion string. When computing ∆ ρ2,i (y A , y Σ , y O , y A ), the intermediate steps of the fixpoint computation Reach i (y A ) encode the insertions themselves, and are stored in a data structure ins to be used later to extract the edit function. Informally, we store in ins y A ,y Σ [i] the set of positions reachable from y A via an insertion string of length i followed by an input event y Σ .
Synthesis
With the game structure GS, we now compute the set of winning positions for the edit function and synthesize a winning edit strategy in Algorithm 1. We characterize the set of winning positions W using a µ-calculus formula. Specifically, in step 1, the µ-calculus formula νZ.P re(Z) is the greatest fixed point containing all positions where the edit function can continuously react to the plant with a winning edit action. If W does not contain the initial position b v0 , then Algorithm 1 returns that the edit synthesis problem is not feasible; i.e., Problem 1 has no solution. Otherwise, there exists a winning edit strategy and we synthesize, starting from step 3, a winning edit automaton EA by breadth-first search on the winning positions. The initial state of EA is the initial position b v0 of GS. Steps 6-18 compute concrete winning actions and construct the corresponding explicit edit automaton. χ s is the set of explored positions in GS.
In each iteration, we take newly-reached positions χ s,diff and compute in step 9 the one-step winning actions act from χ s,diff , using function Winning Actions. With act being computed, in the inner while loop, we extract concrete transitions in act. In step 12, function Extract One extracts one concrete transition. Then, in step 18, we subtract from act all transitions with the same game position b V and plant output event b I , as an edit action for that position and event has already been found. This inner while loop terminates until act is empty. In each iteration, if the extracted transition is an insertion action, then we compute the output string for the insertion action using function Compute Insert Out. Otherwise, the output is the event b O in the extracted transition.
Function Compute Insertion returns a string o of legal insertion events leading from position b V to b V on input b I , and we describe it here informally. Recall the data structure ins stored during the fixpoint computation that defines ∆ ρ2,i in Section 4.2.
b V is reachable from b V via an insertion string of length i followed by b I . Note that we will want to find a shortest such i, for which Proof. Recall that the game structure GS is constructed from G e that recognizes all edit patterns. Hence, the symbolic GS enumerates all edit strategies in a finite structure that satisfy the privacy and utility specifications before potentially reaching a losing position. Because the winning set W is a set of positions where the edit function can continuously react to the plant with an edit action satisfying the specifications, we can synthesize an edit automaton that solves Problem 1 iff the initial game position is winning. A winning edit strategy can in general require memory: it can choose different edit actions based on the history. But because the game is a safety game, we can convert any such strategy to a winning memoryless strategy by repeatedly selecting the same edit action every time it visits the same game position. In fact, Algorithm 1 considers only Algorithm 1: Edit function synthesis
Compute winning set W = νZ.P re(Z) where P re(Z) = 
19 return (S, T rans, s0) memoryless edit strategies. Therefore, the synthesized edit automaton is guaranteed to be finite.
Complexity
Computing the winning set W, which is expressed as a µ-calculus formula of alternation depth 1, can be solved with effort O(N ) where N is the number of states the game structure GS, which is O(n 2 ) if n is the number of states in the plant G. Here effort is measured in symbolic steps, i.e., in the number of preimage computations in the fixpoint in step 1 of the Algorithm. Extracting an edit function also takes O(N ), and hence Algorithm 1 has complexity = O(N ) = O(n 2 ). However, constructing the game structure GS has additional complexity O(N 2 ) = O(n 4 ) because of the least fixpoint computation for every state in the game structure when computing ∆ ρ2,i . In all, Algorithm 1 has complexity of O(n 4 ).
We demonstrate our approach empirically using EdiSyn, an open source Python toolkit we developed for this purpose 1 . EdiSyn implements the synthesis algorithm based on Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs), and relies on the CUDD BDD library [11] and DD [5] , an open source Python binding to CUDD. We ran EdiSyn with Example 2 introduced in Section 2.2. The utility distance is defined based on the L 1 distance, as defined in Section 2.2. Finally, we let the accuracy budget be 2.
We shown in Figure 3 the real and the obfuscated moving traces of Alice and Bob. t i 's denote the time points where their locations are reported. The left figure depicts the real moving traces. At time t 2 , Alice and Bob meet at location (2, 2), which corresponds to a secret state. The right figure depicts the traces output from the edit function. The edit function obfuscates their traces such that Alice and Bob are never reported to be in the same location. Furthermore, the distance between the original and the obfuscated locations always remain within 2. We also ran EdiSyn with examples in the same settings but increasing grid sizes. Grid k×k is the example where Alice and Bob move in the k × k grid world and want to hide their secret meetings. The accuracy budget is set to 2 in all examples. The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 1 . For each grid example, Table 1 shows the number of plant variables (i.e., the number of states plus the number of events), the computation time of the symbolic implementation, the peak number of BDD nodes, and the memory used during the synthesis computation. The experiment was performed on an Intel Core i5 (2.4 GHz, 4 GB) machine running Mac OS X 10.10.5 Yosemite. While we also implemented the explicit (non-symbolic) algorithm, the explicit implementation threw outOfMemory errors on all of the grid examples.
Edit Synthesis for Privacy and Utility
These are preliminary results based on a simple, unoptimized implementation. In addition to optimizing the implementation in terms of memory usage and efficiency of operations, comparison of various variable ordering strategies for the BDDs and reuse of intermediate stages of the fixpoint computations while constructing the game structure are also acknowledged as worthy of further exploration. Finally, observe that the synthesis algorithm is computed offline. Once an edit function is synthesized, it can be used to efficiently edit the plant's output online. 
Related Work
This work combines perspectives and techniques from computer security and formal synthesis. Our threat model and problem formulation are inspired by the definition of differential privacy [2] , where the consumers of data include both legitimate receivers and adversaries, and the goal is to provide privacy while preserving utility with respect to the desired data analytics. Informally, -differential privacy guarantees that the resulting output is insensitive (up to a factor dependent on ) to the modification, deletion or addition of any single record in the original dataset. Utility of a differentially private mechanism is evaluated using query-dependent measures of the deviation between results obtained from the original dataset obtained by applying the mechanism to the original dataset. The edit functions in this work can be viewed as a discrete logic counterpart of differentially private mechanisms; privacy and accuracy here are captured by logical conditions on the edited executions of the plant in comparison with the real executions. Additionally, most traditional approaches to providing privacy rely on cryptographic primitives; however, such schemes require an infrastructure to create and distribute secret keys. In the settings we consider, especially those involving ad-hoc and dynamic networks, and resource-constrained devices, a non-cryptographic solution such as ours may be preferred. There has been some previous work on the synthesis of artifacts enforcing privacy requirements in the discrete logic setting. Specifically, synthesis for a privacy notion called opacity has been explored by researchers in discrete event systems; see e.g., [10, 4, 12] . The edit mechanism in this paper is related to but more powerful than the insertion mechanism developed in [12] . The most distinguishing feature of this work is the threat model. All existing works on synthesis for opacity consider an threat model where every outside observer of the system is malicious. In contrast, the malicious outside observer in this paper is also endowed with some legitimate observational needs. As a consequence of this different threat model, none of the above works addresses questions of the preserving utility of observations. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to formulate the synthesis problem for both privacy and utility. Our work is also distinguished by the presentation of a symbolic encoding of the solution. We encode the synthesis problems symbolically using Binary Decision Diagrams, and are thereby better equipped to address the state explosion problem.
In addition to the field of discrete event systems, we draw inspiration from recent work in robotics that considers the design of discrete filters satisfying privacy and utility constraints provided as pairwise distinguishability (and indistinguishability) requirements on states [8] . Our work is most similar in spirit to this effort, but our privacy and utility constraints are specified as automata theoretic winning conditions instead of pairwise requirements on states. In [8] , the requirements are satisfied via graph colorings:
states that must be indistinguishable have the same color and ones to be distinguished are colored differently. Our edit mechanism is more general, in that it also allows inserting fictitious events.
Finally, the idea of editing event labels on automaton transitions is also employed in [7] , where the authors considered a selfish environment that edits the inputs to the plant automaton. However, the focus in [7] is on deciding whether the plant is resilient to such a selfish environment rather than on synthesizing an edit strategy with privacy and utility objectives.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have defined the problem of synthesizing an obfuscation policy that enforces privacy specifications while preserving utility. The specifications in this work were captured as automata-theoretic requirements on a finite state model of the plant's outputs. Our method allows plants to generate and broadcast event strings for some useful computation, while simultaneously hiding certain secret behaviors from an outside observer. To enforce the privacy and utility specifications, we automatically synthesized an edit function that reacts to the plant's outputs and transforms them in a way that meets both requirements. Our synthesis algorithm was encoded symbolically, improving the efficiency of obtaining a solution. This is, to our knowledge, the first work to consider synthesis for both privacy and utility specifications.
In this work, we considered simple privacy and utility specifications: in fact, our privacy requirement is a safety guarantee. In the future, we will explore the use of more complicated specifications to express these desirables. For example, temporal logics are expressive tools for stating requirements. Formulating privacy and utility as temporal logic formulae would allow a much richer set of specifications. Also, so far our utility specification has taken the form of an accuracy budget constraining the distance between the real and released states. In the future, we will tackle an optimization problem that asks the question, what is the smallest budget for which the problem in this paper becomes feasible?
